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“Business Confidence”
RICHARD GODDARD
Business confidence is a measure of optimism or pessimism that
managers feel about the commercial prospects for their organiza-
tions. This paper uses later medieval high-value English credit data
as a proxy gauge of merchants’ business confidence or uncertainty.
It discusses whether mercantile restriction of credit during the
fifteenth-century recession reflects uncertainty, whereby mer-
chants became increasingly risk-averse and so reduced the amount
of credit they extended to their customers. It discusses the chro-
nological trends in English lending between 1353 and 1532. This
paper examines medieval debt restructuring and argues that this
might similarly reflectmerchants’ commercial confidence or uncer-
tainty. In contrasting two sample years (1375 and 1433), the paper
seeks to identify the motivations and influences that lay behind
medieval merchants’ business decisions more fully. It argues that
merchants’ investment behavior was guided more by local com-
mercial circumstances than it was by profound economic shocks,
such as plague and bullion famine.
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Introduction
To what extent did market uncertainty affect the lending behavior of
medievalmerchants? In themodern economy, business confidence is a
measure of the amount of optimism or pessimism that business man-
agers feel about the prospects for their organizations.1 In principle, if
managers feel that conditions for businesswill becomemore difficult in
the future—increasing uncertainty about their prospects—then busi-
nesses are thought to be less likely to invest or expand and less likely to
purchase new equipment or take on more employees. Business confi-
dence is thought to be affected by both government policies and global
shocks. In the 2007–08 “credit crunch,” risky, subprime lending by
U.S. banks in the real estate market, combined with declining GDP
and a rupture of the housing bubble, led to large numbers of defaulted
mortgages and a subsequent shortage of bank liquidity. This banking
crisis severely curtailed normal bank lending, resulting in a fall in
investment and consumer spending, both ofwhich led to a further sharp
drop in real GDP. A reduction in base interest rates by central banks did
not increase bank lending. Despite—in theory at least— credit being
cheap, because banks were short of cash, they discouraged lending, mak-
ing it very difficult to obtain any sort of loan. One could argue therefore
that the banks’ collapse in confidence in their own liquidity, the future of
themarket, andmost importantly, theabilityof theirdebtors to repaywhat
theyowed, resulted in the significant reduction in the availability of credit
in the economy. The collapse in credit was further affected by a lack of
demand from creditworthy borrowers. These borrowers became increas-
ingly uncertain as to whether there were any profitable business oppor-
tunities open to themat that time.Thus, rises and falls in the availability of
credit might be used as a proxymeasure of certainty or uncertainty in the
marketplace. This paper seeks, in the absence of optimism indices or
indeed much of the paraphernalia of modern business, to assess whether
business confidencemightbemeasured in thisway in theMiddleAges.2 It
asks whether the actions of merchants, particularly with respect to their
lending and borrowing,might be used tomeasure levels of confidence, or
uncertainty, in the future performance of their businesses.
How might the circumstances of modern lending and borrowing
be mapped onto a pre-industrial society that not only lacked central
1. For the impact of consumer confidence upon economic activity and the
reliability of such indices, seeHuth, Eppright, and Taube, “The Indexes of Consumer
Sentiment and Confidence,” 199–206; Ferrer, Salaber, and Zalewska, “Consumer
Confidence Indices,” 195–220; Kilic and Cankaya, “Consumer Confidence and Eco-
nomic Activity,” 3062–3080.
2. For work on uncertainty in the modern period, see Baker, Bloom, and Davis,
“Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty,” 1593–1636; Bloom, “The Impact of Uncer-
taintyShocks,”623–685; Jurado,Ludvigson, andNg, “MeasuringUncertainty,”1177–1216.
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banks but possessed little in the way of a meaningful banking sector?3
Credit was, in the Middle Ages as in the modern period, a central and
universal component of trade. The use of credit as a deferred part pay-
ment for purchased goods or an advance for the future delivery of goods
permeated all levels of later medieval society from the greatest magnates
to the lowliest peasants. Merchants came in all shapes and sizes from
small-time dealers in local commodities, such as fish or coal, buying and
selling from village to village to international import–export merchants
exporting valuable cargoes of English wool and cloth to the Continent.4
Thesebusinesspeopleusedcredit extensively tobuyandsell theirgoods.5
Many small-scale or local credit agreements were transacted infor-
mally or orally—perhaps enacted in the presence of witnesses or on the
strength of a handshake—but by the fourteenth century, high-value
debts were often documented and enrolled in special debt courts
known as staple courts. The Statute of the Staple (1353) was born of a
government economic policy designed to profit from the lucrativewool
export market. The 1353 statute updated an earlier debt-enrollment
apparatus, instigated originally in the Statutes of Acton Burnel (1283)
and of Merchants (1285). Debts were registered in a number of mercan-
tile courts, cited in towns, and especially ports, of commercial impor-
tance, such as Boston, Bristol, Exeter, Hull, Newcastle, Salisbury, and
Westminster.6 Nearly ten thousand staple debt certificates (9,989) reg-
istered between 1353 and 1532 are analyzed in this study. This builds
upon Pamela Nightingale’s work on the relationship between debt and
the money supply with the addition of nearly one thousand recently
discovered sixteenth-century certificates (cataloged under TNA C
152/65 class mark) and by moving beyond the link between bullion
famine and levels of credit to explore the concept of medieval mercan-
tile confidence.7 These staple certificates were part of the process
whereby a creditor (attempted to) recover a defaulted debt that had
3. For Italian banks inmedieval England, see de Roover,Medici Bank, 317325,
325–338; Holmes, “Lorenzo de Medici’s London Branch,” 272–285; Fryde, “The
Deposits of Hugh Despenser,” 345–362; Bolton, “London Merchants and the Borro-
mei Bank,” 53–74.
4. There is a significant literature on English medieval merchants, see, inter
alia, Thrupp, The Merchant Class of Medieval London; James, “A London
Merchant,” 364–376; Hanham, The Celys and Their World; Kermode, Medieval
Merchants; Goddard, Credit and Trade, 49–96.
5. For example, Kermode, Medieval Merchants, 198–205, 223–225, 270–277;
for Gilbert Maghfeld, Richard and George Cely, and John Heritage, see James, “A
London Merchant,” 364–376; Hanham, The Celys and Their World, 187; Dyer, A
Country Merchant, 120–126.
6. Goddard, Credit and Trade, 4–5, 12.
7. See, inter alia, Nightingale, “Monetary Contraction,” 560–575; Nightingale,
“England and the European Depression,” 631–656; Nightingale, “Money and
Credit,” 51–71; Nightingale, “Gold, Credit and Mortality,” 1081–1104.
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been previously registered and enrolled at a staple court. The creditor
would initially attempt to recover the loan through the local staple
court. If the debtor could not be found within the jurisdiction of that
staple, which was common, a certificate was sent to chancery, so that
the sheriff of another county in which the debtor had assets could
attempt to execute the process. The certificates (excluding those from
Yorkshire)8 used in this study are certified extracts of the original
recognizance (the creditor’s copy of the original debt transaction regis-
tered in a staple court), which were sent to Chancery to enable the
sheriff to imprison the defaulting debtor, impound the debtor’s lands
and goods, and deliver these to the creditor in order to repay the
outstanding amount of the debt.9 It provided the facilities by which
England’s trading communitywas able to borrow, often very large sums
of money, relatively securely. Sums transacted in the staple courts
averaged £85 with a mode of £40. This remained fairly consistent
throughout the period, with a modest fall in debt values in the later
fifteenth century (see appendix and the section on patterns of staple
lending). The amounts lent and borrowed using the staple were, there-
fore, substantial. While Michael Postan, and later Jim Bolton, were
skeptical that all these debts were commercial in nature—some, they
felt, might have been used as penal bonds to guarantee good behavior—
Nightingale convincingly argued that most of these transactions were,
in fact, used as sales credit.10 Furthermore, while these debts were
generally used to buy and sell goods, they were not only transacted
by those described as “merchants.” Nightingale persuasively argued
not only that knights and other members of the gentry were actively
engaged in the credit market, but also that this became more pro-
nounced in the fifteenth century.11 More recent work has reinforced
this conviction and argued that staple credit was used predominantly
for commercial purposes, in particular to buy and sell wholesale mer-
chandise within the English domestic economy, including imported
goods that were redistributed throughout the kingdom.12
8. For Yorkshire, see Kermode, “Merchants, Overseas Trade and Urban
Decline,” 51–73; Kermode, “Money and Credit,” 475–501.
9. Goddard, Credit and Trade, 4–5, 9–12. For earlier work on the statute
merchant and staple (TNA C 241) certificates and the English money supply, see
Nightingale, “Money and Credit,” 51–71; Nightingale, “Gold, Credit andMortality,”
1083–1100.
10. Nightingale, “MonetaryContraction,” 565;Nightingale, “ACrisis of Credit,”
149–163; Bolton, “A Reply to Pamela Nightingale’s ‘A Crisis in Credit,’” 164–165.
11. Postan, “Private Financial Instruments,” 40–41; Bolton,Money in theMedi-
eval English Economy, 278; Nightingale, “Knights and Merchants,” 36–62.
12. For the commercial use of these instruments, see Goddard, Credit and
Trade, 21–22, 85–95; Stevens, “London Creditors,” 1094; McNall, “The Business
of Statutory Debt Registries,” 73–74.
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The workings of the system are best illustrated by an example. In
1362, a Gloucester merchant called Reginald French purchased £266
13s. 4d.–worth consignment ofwool on credit from aDevon soldier and
diplomat, Sir Guy de Brian (or “Briene”), who also described himself as
amerchant ofGloucestershire andDevon. Frenchwas required to repay
this debt in seventeen days.13 This transaction, which, unusually for
staple certificates, recorded the merchandise for which the debt was
owed, was enrolled as a recognizance at the Bristol Staple court on
September 12, 1362, and a copy of this document was given to Guy de
Brian as the creditor. The direction of the transaction suggests that the
high-grade fleeces had been collected from de Brian’s demesne flocks
in Devon and elsewhere and then sold to the Gloucester merchant at
Bristol on credit.14 This was a significant consignment, representing
possibly 1,900 stones (ca. 12,000 kg) of wool or roughly twelve sarplers
(canvas containers for transporting wool) and speaks to the extent of de
Brian’s interests in wool.15 The rapidity with which the debt was to be
repaid—the period of which was negotiated between the creditor and
debtor—suggests that French sought to sell the wool consignment on to
another, possibly alien, merchant to be exported to the Continent. This
second transaction also would have involved credit in some way, but
there is no evidence of this later transaction within the staple evidence.
Unfortunately, the debtor, Reginald French, failed to repay the debt. Six
years later in 1368, the creditor, Guy de Brian, began the process of
recovering his money. This period between the default date and the
presentation of the certificate in Chancery is longer than the mean
period for the certificate data as a whole (three years, fourteen days)
and suggests that de Brian held off before dragging French through the
indignity of debtors’ prison and the confiscation of his assets (this
delaying tactic is discussed in more detail in “Repayment Terms and
Debt Restructuring”).16 De Brian ultimately went to the Bristol court,
showed his copy of the recognizance, which was compared to the
enrolled copy, and action was begun against French. As French was
not found within the jurisdiction of the mayor of Bristol, de Brian
obtained a certificate (the principal evidence used in this study) from
the staple court that confirmed that the debt had been registered there
andwas nowoverdue. This certificatewas sent toChancery to begin the
process of recovering the money.
13. TNA C 241/149/57; for Guy de Brian, see Oxford Dictionary of National
Biography, accessed May 4, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/38896.
14. For knights use of mercantile credit, see Nightingale, “Knights and
Merchants,” 36–62.
15. At 1360s prices, see Farmer, “Prices and Wages,” 467.
16. Goddard, Credit and Trade, 33–34, 114–115.
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While in the modern economy lending to businesses is generally
undertaken by banks—although other sources, such as “crowd
funding,” are also available—in the medieval period English domestic
trade was generally financed by individual merchants, partnerships of
merchants, or sometimes larger syndicates.17 Credit was generally
extended on a transitory transaction-by-transaction basis rather than
in the form of venture capital loaned to a business as an established and
enduring commercial entity.18 Other problems exist when comparing
medieval and modern domestic trade finance. Interest rates, and par-
ticularly the central bank base rate, the manipulation of which plays
such a large role in economic policy, did not exist in a period that
entirely lacked central banks. Furthermore, as is well known, usury,
or the charging of interest on loans, was forbidden by Church law in the
Middle Ages.19 Nonetheless, interest was regularly charged even if the
amount was hidden. This means that historians are generally unable to
accurately calculate movements in interest rates over time.20
Finally, unlike in the modern economy, medieval historians are not
able to determine default rates with any accuracy, nor whether loans
and sales creditsweredefaulteduponmore oftenduring recessions. For
the Middle Ages, Pamela Nightingale has suggested that defaulted
staple debts, which produced the certificates studied here, represent
about one-fifth of all credit undertaken using the staple. She noted that
in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth-century London recogni-
zances, default rates varied between 18.8 and 22.9 percent; in the later
fourteenth and early fifteenth-century Coventry recognizance rolls,
default rates were both similar and consistent at between 19.3 and
21.7 percent. While default rates varied from year to year, this consis-
tency was maintained despite the commercial conditions of the two
periods being markedly different.21 Although generalizations based
upon these data need to be treated cautiously, Nightingale’s best guess
of a 20 percent default rate is used here as an a priori assumption in the
absence of definitive evidence to the contrary.
Nonetheless, despite these problems and the obvious differences
between medieval and modern economies and the credit transactions
17. For a considered examination of premodern economic data and the prob-
lems in doing so, see Broadberry et al., British Economic Growth.
18. For the advantages of small-scale partnerships over larger firms in northern
European medieval trade, see Jenks, “Small Is Beautiful,” 192–193, 199–200.
19. Wood, Medieval Economic Thought, 181–196.
20. For a calculation of commercial interest rates used in international trade and
foreign exchange, see Bell, Brooks, and Moore, “Cambium non est mutuum,” 384–
388.
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taking place within them, it is argued here that movements in levels of
borrowing and lending in both periods reflect the confidence firms—or
merchants—had in the future performance of their business. The inter-
nal andunchanging characteristics of the staple system, even in the face
of innovations in the use of certain financial instruments, such as bills
of exchange, over the period allow us considerable insight into the
preferences, reactions, and coping strategies of those merchants who
used this system.This paper seeks therefore to use debt evidence to gain
access to, and thus more fully understand, the motivations and influ-
ences that lay behind medieval merchants’ business decisions. It first
examines the particular business environment and shocks that mer-
chants had to negotiate in the later Middle Ages and then moves on to
discuss chronological patterns in the debt evidence; the fourth
section pays particular attention tomedieval repayment terms and debt
restructuring thatmight reflectmerchants’ confidence or uncertainty in
their business prospects; the fifth section compares and contrasts two
sample years, 1375 and 1433, using the staple debt evidence in con-
junction with other contemporary economic data to assess the effec-
tiveness of this method; and the last section draws together some
conclusions.
The Business Environment of Late Medieval England
It is assumed that, in theMiddle Ages, shocks to the economy—often of
biblical proportions—must have loomed large in the minds of mer-
chants and affected their investment behavior. Richard Britnell
employed a “mixed-bag”metaphor to explain change in the later medi-
eval economy, arguing that, at anyparticular time, there are likely to be a
multiplicity of varying influences on the economic behavior of mer-
chants, pushing them with different strengths in a variety of divergent
directions.22 The later Middle Ages experienced a number of over-
whelmingexogenous shocks, inmanycases contemporaneously.Recur-
rent pandemics of bubonic plague throughout the period decimated the
European population with little sign of recovery until the end of the
fifteenth century.23 Despite warnings that a simple correlation between
levels of population and levels of economic activity are far too over-
simplistic, it is recognized that long-term falling population levels had a
depressive impact upon the economy as a whole. Abrupt and critical
falls in population, on top of an already depleted fifteenth-century
22. Britnell, Britain and Ireland, 90.
23. Hatcher, Plague, Population and the English Economy; Hatcher, “Mortality
in the Fifteenth Century,” 19–38.
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population,mightwell have brought diseconomies and significant fluc-
tuations in levels of economic activity and thus, by extension, affected
the amount of credit extended in England for that economic activity.
While thedemographiccrisis continued,mostEuropeaneconomies also
suffered from a substantial shortage of bullion.24 It has been argued that
the bullion famine of the later Middle Ages resulted in recession and
falling prices. Monetary historians argue that as the currency in circu-
lation contracted, so did the amount of credit available for business.25 It
was the complex interplay of these elements in conjunction with other
shocks, such as endemic warfare and deteriorating climatic conditions,
particularly in the mid-fifteenth century, that impacted upon the econ-
omy in a macro sense.26 The question is, however, from a micro per-
spective, towhat extent did these global forcesweigh upon theminds of
those negotiating sales credit in this period?
Uncertainty or a lack of confidence at a local level, rather than
rational utility or profit maximization, tends to lie at the heart of cut-
backs in mercantile lending during recessions. In the 1920s both Frank
Knight and John Maynard Keynes separately theorized about uncer-
tainty and its effects on the modern economy.27 According to Knight,
uncertainty exists in many aspects of economic life. He differentiated
between risk—which is measurable—and uncertainty, the product of a
lack of information—which is not.28 Uncertainty causes anxiety,which
adversely affects investors’ ability to accurately calculate the costs or
benefits of their decisions, inevitably contributing to risk aversion.29
Risk-averse banks ration credit and risk-averse entrepreneurs and
households reduce their borrowing.30 Keynes discussed the effect of
uncertainty in terms of liquidity preference anddisquiet over the future
course of interest rates.31 Investors who anticipated financial problems
or who believed the interest rate to be inaccurate would keep their
resources liquid rather than lending them out.32 Recent research has
24. Miskimin, “Monetary Movements and Market Structure,” 470–490; May-
hew, “Population, Money Supply and the Velocity of Circulation,” 238–257; Night-
ingale, “Monetary Contraction,” 560–575; Nightingale, “England and the European
Depression,” 631–656.
25. Nightingale, “Monetary Contraction,” 560–575.
26. Britnell, “The Economic Context,” 44–46; Bolton, The Medieval English
Economy, 290; Campbell, “Grain Yields on English Demesnes,” 121–174.
27. Keynes, Treatise on Probability; Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.
28. This is particularly the case when attempting to assign risk probabilities to
unheard of events (known as “black swans”), making these by far the most danger-
ous; see Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 197–232.
29. Langlois, and Cosgel, “Frank Knight on Risk”, 485–461.
30. See, e.g., Cohn et al., “Evidence for Countercyclical Risk Aversion,”
860–885.
31. Runde, “Keynesian Uncertainty and Liquidity Preference,” 129–144.
32. Keynes, General Theory, 169.
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refined these findings with regard to credit and liquidity preferences.33
Andrea Buraschi, Fabio Trojani, and Andrea Vedolin demonstrated
that economic uncertainty increases credit spreads, which, in itself,
indicates growing concern by investors about the ability of borrowers to
service their debts; Fabián Valencia illustrated that banks, particularly
small banks with lower capital ratios, increased their liquidity buffers
by reducing lending during periods of uncertainty (including during
natural disasters).34
In the Middle Ages, merchants (like small banks) operated in a
similar way. They realized that if one of their customers was unable
to pay backwhatwas owed, then they themselvesmight default on their
repayments to other merchants from whom they themselves had bor-
rowed. This potential bankruptcy-inducing domino effect explains
why businesses in general, and medieval merchants in particular,
restricted lending during periods of economic unease. This surely rep-
resents the definition of a lack of business confidence. The widespread
reduction in lending by medieval merchants during the fifteenth-
century recession, discussed in more detail later, might be compared
to the cautious, risk-averse business strategies that are common during
modern recessions. These strategies are often based upon little more
than rumors of economic problems, which then become self-
reinforcing.35 In the medieval world in which the Horsemen of the
Apocalypse seemed very much in evidence, merchants needed to esti-
mate the riskiness of their potential ventures in a period overflowing
with unknowable uncertainties that were beyond their control.
Patterns of Staple Lending in Late Medieval England
The chronology of high-value staple lending in England, as seen in
the distribution of certificates of defaulted debts over time, is used
here as a proxy measurement of merchants’ (and others’) confidence
in the success, or potential failure, of their commercial ventures. The
extremely high number of certificates with recoverable transaction
dates (9,841) and the long chronology of 179 years of the staple
system allow broad trends to be observed. The dates used in these
data were the dates when the original credit transactions were
33. Buraschi, Trojani, and Vedolin, “Economic Uncertainty, Disagreement and
Credit Markets,” 1281–1296; Valencia, “Aggregate Uncertainty,” 150–165.
34. Buraschi, Trojani, andVedolin, “EconomicUncertainty, Disagreement, and
Credit Markets,” 1282–1283, 1286, 1290–1291; Valencia, “Aggregate Uncertainty,”
150–153, 155, 157, 159, 160–162.
35. Miskin, “Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises,” 69–108; Lux,
“Herd Behavior, Bubbles and Crashes,” 881–896.
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enrolled at the staple courts, rather than the dates, often several years
later, by which time the debtor had defaulted and the certificate had
arrived in Chancery. This is important, because when the original
debt transaction was enacted and enrolled in court, the creditor pre-
sumably felt fairly confident that the debt would be repaid on time. If
the debtor defaulted, the creditor could still fall back upon the courts
to recover at least some of the money. The data are presented here in
two ways. First, the number of staple credit transactions enacted in
each year over the period are displayed in Figure 1. These annual
totals are smoothed using a ten-year moving average in order to more
clearly identify long-term trends. Figure 2 uses the same data to show
the annual total value in pounds (£) of enrolled certificates over the
period.36 Once again, the long-term trends are observable with refer-
ence to a ten-year moving average. The appendix tabulates the decen-
nial mean and modal debt values between 1360 and 1529.
The chronology revealed in Figures 1 and 2 indicates a peak in
lending the 1370–1380s, which chronology fits well with historians’
understanding of a confident post-plague business environment and
Figure 1 Annual number of staple debt certificates sent to Chancery, 1353–1532
(N = 9,841), with a ten-year moving average.
Source: TNA C 241 and C 152/65.
36. These data record nominal rather than deflated values, because the most
consequential impact of price inflation was felt after the end of the period, particu-
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economic resilience in the later fourteenth century.37 This period is
discussed in more detail in “Highs and Lows.” The data then suggest a
significant drop between the 1390s and the 1420s.38 This was followed
by a much slower rate of decline in certificate numbers between the
1420s and the mid-1450s, and a modest recovery in defaulted enroll-
ments between the late 1460s and about 1500. Following a forty-five-
year decline between the 1380s and the 1420s, the annual value of the
certificates remained low throughout most of the fifteenth century (see
Figure 2). These data therefore suggest that the early fifteenth century
witnessed a severe reduction in the availability of credit. The staple
debt evidence places the gravest period of recession between the
mid-1420s and the mid-1450s, with lending activity remaining muted
Figure 2 Total annual value (in £) of staple debt certificates sent to Chancery,
1353–1532 (N = 9,841), with a ten-year moving average.
Source: TNA C 241 and C 152/65.
37. Bridbury, Economic Growth, 25–27, 35–36; Hatcher, Plague, Population
and the English Economy, 31–35; Britnell, Commercialisation, 194–196.
38. In the first half of the fifteenth century, the decennial mean debt amounts
appear to rise (see appendix). This is because, with a severe fall in certificate num-
bers, high-value debts make up a significantly higher proportion of annual lending.
For example, in 1416–17, three debts totaling £8,667 (out of only seventy-four debts
in these two years) were registered (TNA C 241/216/27; C 241/212/42; C
241/214/18). This results in inflated means for this period. The modal averages are
therefore a more pertinent guide.
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throughout the remaining century.39 As is well known, this period has
been characterized by JohnHatcher and others as a period of significant
economic decline, with particular economic problems being felt
between the 1440s and 1470s.40 Indeed, the data for the 1460s to the
1480s indicates a reduction in decennial mean and modal debt values
at this time (see appendix), suggesting merchants might have been
lending more often at this time (see Figure 1), but on average, they lent
lower amounts. The contours of the early fifteenth-century commercial
crisis are similarly discussed inmore detail in “Highs and Lows.” This
period of general credit rationing was followed by a more significant
revival, both in terms of numbers of debts and their value, after 1513
and into the late 1520s. The economic recovery of the late fifteenth and
early sixteenth centuries is attested to in the historiography.41 The
crisis in the rural economy had generally passed by the 1480s—possi-
bly related to rising temperatures, and thus more favorable growing
conditions, between ca. 1480 and ca. 1550.42 Landlords recovered from
the midcentury agricultural recession to emerge during the 1470s and
1480s in a much stronger economic position than had been the case
during the agricultural crises earlier in the century.43 The demographic
evidence suggests that life expectancy increased and the English pop-
ulation started to recover between 1485 and 1520.44 The output of the
London Mint also increased during the early years of the sixteenth
century and then again more spectacularly in the 1540s, resulting in
the circulation ofmoney at the very least keeping pacewith the increas-
ing population.45 Furthermore, there is evidence of rising prices in the
1480s.46 An improving agricultural economy, a rising population, and
an increase in the supply of coins all occurred at exactly the same time
39. Stiglitz and Weiss, “Credit Rationing,” 393–394, 408–409; Stevens,
“London Creditors,” 1098, 1100–1101.
40. Britnell,Britain and Ireland, 327, 329, 330, 332; Goddard,Credit andTrade,
109–119; Hatcher, “The Great Slump of the Mid-fifteenth Century,” 237–272.
41. See, inter alia, Brown, “Surviving the Mid-fifteenth-century Recession,”
209–231; Dyer, Lords and Peasants, 165–185; Hatcher, Piper and Stone, “Monastic
mortality,” 667-87; for an alternative and less optimistic interpretation, see Britnell,
“The English Economy and Government,” 89-116; Britnell, The Closing of the Mid-
dle Ages, 209–247; Clark, “Growth or Stagnation?,” 73–78.
42. Campbell, “Grain Yields on English Demesnes,” 121–174.
43. Brown, “Surviving the Mid-fifteenth-century Recession,” 209–231; Dyer,
Lords and Peasants, 165–185; Du Boulay, “A Rentier Economy in the Later Middle
Ages,” 427–438; Fryde, Peasants and Landlords, 262.
44. Harvey, Living and Dying in England, 112–145; Hatcher, Piper, and Stone,
“Monastic Mortality,” 667–687; Dodds, “Estimating Arable Output Using Durham
Priory Tithe Receipts,” 245–285; Britnell, “The English Economy and Government,”
105–113; Broadberry et al., British Economic Growth, 15–17, 20–21, 27.
45. This was partly the result of recoinages and debasements in this period;
Allen, Mints and Money, 292; Craig, The Mint, 413–414.
46. Mayhew, “Prices in England,” 5.
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as merchants and others decided to increase the amount, thereby also
raising the annual value, of the credit they offered to their customers
(see Figures 1 and 2). The question to be addressed, then, is do these
broad patterns in lending reflect not just periods of economic growth
and decline in England but, more subtly, periods of confidence, for
example in the later fourteenth and early sixteenth centuries, or mer-
cantile uncertainty, as in the fifteenth century, in the commercial out-
look of those who used the staple system?
Repayment Terms and Debt Restructuring
While this paper has, as an a priori assumption that about 20 percent of
staple debts were defaulted upon over the period as a whole, it is
possible to refine our understanding of merchants’ concerns over their
customers’ capacity to repay their debts by examining the negotiated
repayment terms recorded in each staple agreement. Surprisingly little
work has been undertaken on pre-industrial repayment rates.47 These
repayment dates, often in installments, were agreed upon when the
deal was first struck and the credit extended and were recorded in
the original recognizance and, after default, copied into the certificate.
The terms of repayment recorded in staple certificates varied consid-
erably during the period under investigation here. The shortest repay-
ment termwas one day (these were rare, occurring in just 0.1 percent of
the certificates) and the longest was over twenty-three years; the modal
value was exactly one year (in 0.9 percent of the certificates). Themean
repayment term for the entire data set was five-and-a-half months,
which seems a reasonable term for credit extended to fund trading that
took place predominantly within the kingdom rather than beyond it.
The decennial average term in these transactions, shown in Figure 3,
changed over time, reflecting confidence, or lack of it, in the commer-
cial environment in which the deal was negotiated. This mean repay-
ment term is thus comparable over the whole period. Evidence from
Early Modern France, albeit from a later period and an unrelated eco-
nomic context, which uses different types of debt agreement within a
system that, unlike the medieval staple system, used notaries as bro-
kers, suggests that during periods of commercial uncertainty, such as
the later seventeenth century, while borrowers might have wanted the
security of a long-term loan, lenders preferred shorter-term loans. Dur-
ing periods of prosperity and stability, such as in the mid-eighteenth
47. McNall, “The Business of Statutory Debt Registries,” 75; Nightingale, “Paro-
chial Clergy,” 97; Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal, Priceless Markets, 37–40,
60–61, 100.
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century, there was an explosion of private borrowing and a move to
long-term loans. Unlike English medieval repayment terms of a few
months, the Early Modern Parisian repayment terms were commonly
between ten and thirty years.48 TheEnglish staple evidence ismarkedly
different. Shorter repayment terms had the advantage of speeding up
business. The shorter the repayment term, the more quickly a new
profitable deal could be transacted. Unlike in the Early Modern French
data, onewayof interpreting shortermedieval English repayment terms
like these in the staple evidence, is that they might indicate a dynamic
market for goods and a confident business environment. As can be seen
from Figure 2, the mean repayment terms are the shortest (averaging
about four-and-a-half months) between 1360 and 1409 at the same time
as the volume of credit available in the English economy is at its post-
plague apex. Repayment terms started to rise in the 1410s just as the
amount of mercantile lending started to wane. The 1430s and 1440s—
the period associated earlier with a decline inmercantile lending—saw
increases in the lengths of term for credit repayments, from an average
of roughly four-and-a-half months in the late fourteenth century to
more than nine months in the 1430s (see Figure 2). This was a general
Figure 3 Mean decennial repayment terms in months, 1360–1529.
Source: TNA C 241 and C 152/65.
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policy of lengthening the repayment terms followed by many lenders
(46.5 percent of the certificates from the 1430s were for terms longer
than five months).49 Nightingale associated a similar lengthening of
repayment terms during the less favorable economic conditions of
the 1330s and 40s.50
The impact of declining credit availability in a recession can explain
the lengthening credit terms found in these years. If merchants and
others saw their fellow merchants failing to repay what they owed in
periods of challenging commercial circumstances, they might then
negotiate longer repayment terms with those with whom they were
conducting their business in order to allow them more time to pay it
back. In times of declining demand and consumption, those who had
bought goods on credit might fear that goods would become harder to
sell, or take longer to sell than previously, and thus might negotiate
deals that allowed them longer to pay back the credit they owed.51
Therefore, one way of interpreting these data is by regarding lengthen-
ing credit terms as an expression of faltering business confidence.
Beyond the very different economic circumstances, systems, and con-
text, one of the reasons why the situation in Early Modern Paris might
have been different from the medieval English situation is that while
both environments suffered from asymmetric information for lenders,
those in Paris had the advantage of the brokerage and information-
gathering expertise of the city’s notaries, the existence of newspapers,
and networking hubs, such as coffeehouses. These allowed lenders and
borrowers to not only becomemore aware of impending crises, but also
to perceive these on amore global scale. Thereby, and unlike theirmore
locally focused medieval English predecessors, they could react to
economic instability in different ways.
Themedieval solution of using longer repayment terms in periods of
uncertainty can be seen again when examiningmedieval debt readjust-
ment. Paying back a debt could involve a considerable amount of
complicated maneuvering or readjustment, especially if problems
arose and the debtor was unable to repay the debt on the required date,
a common predicament during recessions. As Matthew Stevens sug-
gests, once a debtor had defaulted, his creditors might well all seek
49. For similar patterns in Yorkshire, see Kermode, Medieval Merchants, 239–
240; and for creditors using bonds in the court of common pleas, see Stevens,
“London Creditors,” 1091, 1103.
50. Nightingale, “Parochial Clergy,” 97.
51. During the fifteenth-century recession, creditors in the court of common
pleas transacted loans or sales of goods credit agreements (as opposed to bonds) that
were “payable on request”—an option not available in the staple court—rather than
negotiating specific repayment terms. See Stevens, “London Creditors,” 1101–1102.
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speedy restitution at the same time.52 An alternative strategy was what
is known as “forbearance.” This is a form of debt readjustment wherein
a creditor refrained from enforcing a debt immediately when it fell due
through the staple court and instead came to an informal agreement
with the debtor to pay any balance of the debt at a later date. For
example, in February of 1522, Tomas Twyn, a member of the London
Barber-Surgeons company, lent £30 to a London partnership of a
Grocer, John Reve, and a Merchant-Taylor, William Bogyn, through
the staple system.53 The debt was to be repaid six months later. Reve
and Bogyn did not repay the debt. However, instead of suing them
through the staple, Twynwrote up a new agreement three months after
the original repayment had fallen due, saying that if Reve and Bogyn
paid £10 a year later (in July 1523) and another £10 at the following
Christmas in 1523 to Twyn or his attorney, then the original £30 pay-
ment would no longer be enforced. This would have allowed Reve and
Bogyn to pull together sufficient resources, or for their business for-
tunes to change, in order to repay what they owed.54 This was sound
business practice, as pursuing the two men through the courts would
have incurred some cost (even if this would have been ultimately
recovered through damages), but more importantly, Twyn’s restraint
would have maintained a workable business relationship among the
threemen that would have allowed them to do business again; it would
alsomaintain Reve’s andBogyn’s reputations and probably, at the same
time, enhance Twyn’s reputation as a worthy and reasonable person
withwhom to engage inbusiness.Unfortunately, JohnRevediedduring
this process, butWilliam Bogyn didmanage to pay the first installment
of £10 and so petitioned the Chancellor to be released from debtors’
prison. The outcome of the case is not known, nor indeed is it certain
that Twyn got his remaining £10 back from Bogyn, but this serves as a
good example of debt readjustment to accommodate shifting personal
circumstances—in this case the death of one of the partners—made by
medieval merchants.55 The fact that debt recovery did not occur auto-
matically in the staple system—rather, it was up to the lender to decide
when to approach Chancery to start the recovery process—tends to
support the idea that delays in doing so might represent forbearance.
There is strong evidence of medieval forbearance of this kind, par-
ticularly in the period of tight credit between the 1420s and the 1450s.
The mean period between the debt default and the initiation of the
52. Stevens, “London Creditors,” 1102.
53. TNA C131/265/15-16; see Ingram, “Archetypes and Individuals,” 2019,
264–266.
54. TNA C 241/246/105; see also Kadens, “Pre-modern Credit Networks,”
2443–2445.
55. Schofield, “Dealing in Crisis,” 267–268.
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process to recover bad debts through the staple was three years and
fourteen days. As can be seen in Figure 4, this period lengthened at
exactly the same time as credit became harder to obtain between 1420
and 1459.
This suggests that during the difficult recessionary decades, more
creditors decided not to sue defaulting debtors as quickly as they had
before. More of them waited longer by perhaps informally adjusting
debts or debt repayments before taking the final sanction of suing
them through the staple courts. While forbearance is difficult to
demonstrate empirically without supportive documentary material,
it seems a logical way of interpreting the evidence. As Figure 4
suggests, there is evidence of increasing lengths of time between debt
defaults and the issue of the corresponding certificate in several of
the decades of economic crisis in the early to mid-fifteenth century.
This implies that, as in modern economies, delaying legal action,
forbearance, and informally lengthening the repayment terms in
order to have any hope of recovery became a necessary method used
by lenders during the years of recession. Merchants must have chosen
carefully whether to use leniency and extend the repayment period or
use the full force of the law and recover the money through the
courts. Thus, readjustment or forbearance might have been, in many
situations, the best hope of recovery. Indeed, as Emily Kadens has
suggested, in periods of economic uncertainty, forbearance might
Figure 4 Mean period (in years) between debt default and certificate issue,
1360–1529.
Source: TNA C 241 and C 152/65.
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have maintained confidence in a floundering system, helping to keep
it afloat.56
The prosperous economy of the early sixteenth century is also indi-
cated by the repayment terms of the surviving certificates (Figure 3). As
with the booming years of the later fourteenth century, the average
length of repayment started to fall, first to under six months in the first
decade of the sixteenth century, then down to just over five months in
the 1520s. This decreasing term indicates merchants were beginning to
negotiate shorter repayment term in a commercial environment in
which they felt more secure. Furthermore, Figure 4 indicates that, at
the same time, creditors tended to abandon forbearance (except in the
unrepresentative 1510s)57 and instead went to law more rapidly in
order to recover their money, suggesting perhaps that the velocity of
transactions was speeding up.
Thus, changes in the negotiated repayment terms in staple credit
agreements might well be related to the parties’ confidence in the
repayment being made in full and on time. Once again, this is a
fairly blunt instrument, observable only in decennial trends, with
which to examine merchants’ concerns over the expectations for
their businesses. However, lengthening repayment terms in
periods of testing economic conditions might well reflect general
patterns of declining confidence in the fifteenth-century English
economy. Interpreting decennial changes in the time it took cred-
itors to begin the process of recovering their defaulted debts as
forbearance or debt readjustment, which lengthened in periods of
tight credit, similarly speaks to merchants acting upon their con-
cerns over, or confidence in, the trying commercial circumstances
of this period.
Highs and Lows: 1375 and 1433
Two sample dates, one during a period of high debt registration
(1375) and the second during a significant downturn in lending
(1433), have been chosen to evaluate whether the debt evidence
can be used as a valid measure of medieval business confidence.
Despite the problems of a lack of detailed business evidence for the
medieval period, some attempt will be made here to isolate, at the
very least in the broadest sense, exogenous and endogenous factors
56. Kadens, “Pre-modern Credit Networks,” 2452, 1455.
57. This is on account of the considerable fall in the number of surviving
certificates in this decade, likely the result of archival loss.
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that might have affected the business environment in the years
preceding these sample years.58
The first case study examines staple lending around the year 1375.
To what extent did the survivors of such apocalyptic cataclysms as the
Black Death feel confident about their prospects? Did it influence their
investment behavior? Merchants’ business strategies in a time of recur-
ring plague epidemics seemperplexing. Instead of fleeing the disease or
investing with caution in the later fourteenth century, merchants did
the opposite and increased the amount that they lent using the staple.
This can be seen in the large number of defaulted debts enrolled at
English staple courts in 1375 (see Table 1), one of the high points in
staple debt registration, and the gently increasing number of debt reg-
istrations in the years leading up to that year.
The fourth pestilence struck in 1374–75 after a period of respite from
plague that lasted only five years. According to chroniclers, this out-
break had begun in the towns in the south of England, and many had
died in London, including those from among the “best and richest of all
the city”—in other words, those who were typical or regular staple
users—before the plague spread northward.59 While it is reasonable
to suppose that the returning plague outbreaksmademerchants register
a higher proportion of their debts in staple courts as an added layer of
financial security, the high numbers of debt registrations in staple
courts of 1375 cannot be blamed on the highmortality of that year. This
is because the dates used in this study are the dateswhen the debtswere
first registered, not the dates when staple proceedings were com-
menced against defaulting debtors who, possibly unbeknownst to their
creditors, had died of plague and thus not repaid what they owed.
Despite heavy losses to plague in that year, and the associated chaos
that it occasioned, merchants chose to enroll more new debts at staple
Table 1 Annual count and value of staple certificates by transaction date, 1370–
1375
Year Number of certificates Annual debt value (£)
1370 98 £5,436 14s. 10d.
1371 107 £8,457 16s. 2d.
1372 111 £7,115 7s. 10d.
1373 120 £9,230 7s. 2d.
1374 108 £10,508 4s. 10d.
1375 130 £10,798 5s. 7d.
Source: TNA C 241.
58. For a discussion of later medieval economic crisis years, see Casson and
Casson, “Economic Crises in England,” 104, 106.
59. Rawcliffe, Urban Bodies, 362.
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courts than they had in the previous five years (see Table 1). Clearly,
then, the explanation for this rising trendmust lie elsewhere. In terms of
the amount of coinage in circulation, one of the other variables that
historians consider an important component of patterns of lending,
Martin Allen estimates the size of the money supply in 1377 to have
been between £1,420,000 and £2,390,000, the second-highest amount
of money in circulation between 1158 and 1544, with high mint out-
puts, albeit slowly declining at this time, particularly of gold coinage
much used by merchants, throughout the 1360s and 1370s.60
Those who bought and sold using staple credit in this year give a
clear impression of merchants responding to a thriving commercial
environment. Merchants such as William Berkham, Citizen and Pep-
perer of London, bought £200worth of merchandise on credit from two
London grocers in February of 1375; Henry Warner of Charfield
(Gloucestershire) sold £40 worth of wool to Gloucester merchant, John
Bourdon; and Wiltshire shearman, John Choghe, sold £40 worth of
“diverse merchandise,” probably including wool, to a merchant from
Amesbury (Wiltshire).61 Importantly, 45 percent of the transactions of
1375 were enrolled outside Westminster. This kingdom-wide credit
network was typical of staple lending between the late fourteenth and
early fifteenth centuries but contrasts sharply with the London-centric
lending of the later fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.62Merchants
fromYork transacted credit agreementswithmerchants fromYorkshire
and Northumberland, merchants from Bristol sold goods to Somerset
merchants, andWelsh merchants bought goods on credit from Chester
merchants in a pattern that was wholly typical of the later fourteenth
century.63 The picture presented by these agreements is one of a wide-
spread, flourishing, and confident, possibly demand-led, business
environment that, even in the face of high plaguemortality, encouraged
merchants to extend credit to their customers. How might this be
explained?
It has been argued that by the 1380s, the English economy recovered
and even started to boom in terms of rising per capita output and
income and rising prices.64 The buoyancy of the post-plague English
60. Allen,Mints andMoney, 313, 344, and appendix, table C.3; Palma, “Recon-
struction of theMoneySupply,” 4–5, 8, 15, 19; formerchants’use of gold coinage, see
Munro, Wool, Cloth and Gold, 84.
61. TNA C 241/157/180; C 241/157/3; C 241/163/9.
62. Goddard, Credit and Trade, 204–206.
63. TNA C 241/158/86; C 241/162/77; C 241/177/121; C 241/167/12.
64. Bridbury, Economic Growth, 25–7, 35–6; Hatcher, Plague, Population and
the English Economy, 31–5; Britnell, Commercialisation, 194–196; Britnell, Britain
and Ireland, 352, 496–498; Mayhew, “Prices in England,” 19, 31; Broadberry et al.,
British Economic Growth, 189–191.
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economy in the face of dramatic demographic decline is explained by
the increased wages, and thus consumption, of the plague survivors,
even if aggregate consumption was reduced by high mortality. One of
the clearest indicators of increasing demand in this period is the expan-
sion of the domestic textile industry in England in the later fourteenth
century. The growth of the English cloth industry in this period is well
attested and commonly quantified in terms of consistently increasing
exports of domestically produced textiles. In the 1380s this reached
178,637 broadcloths, a number that jumped to 211,121 during the
1390s.65 Much of the demand for manufactured cloth must have been
domestic and thus remained unrecorded.66 This surge in cloth exports
is a manifestation of domestic economic dynamism, as English cloth-
makers were manufacturing a product that was in demand all over
Europe and was fine enough to compete with Flemish cloth. Few
English regions were isolated from the economic feedback of interna-
tional trade. Many domestic producers were locked into long-distance
trade, as they were engaged in the wool and cloth manufacture ulti-
mately destined for export.Other English exports, such ashides and tin,
followed a similar trajectory, with high points in the 1390s and 1400s.
This was the result both of an expansion of English cattle farming and a
subsequent increase in production of leather goods for the domestic
market and an increase in domestic tin production at the same time.67
These goods, both finished and unfinished, were commonly bought
and sold within the domestic economy using staple credit. The export
figures—acting here as a guide to levels of domestic production—tend
to confirm a picture of a post-plague boom. Furthermore, by 1377, real
wages had risen by45percent, undoubtedly raising the living standards
of the survivors of the Black Death, resulting in, it is assumed, greater
spending power for many people.68
How might increased spending and a flourishing economy in a
period of unparalleled human disaster be explained in terms of busi-
ness confidence? An understandable uncertainty as to when the
65. Carus-Wilson and Coleman, England’s Export Trade; Power and Postan,
Studies in English Trade, 330–361; Kowaleski, “Port towns,” 467–494. For a discus-
sion of the value of these sources, see Carus-Wilson and Coleman, England’s Export
Trade, 18–33, 201–207; Britnell, Britain and Ireland, 329, 332, 417.
66. Britnell, Britain and Ireland, 417–418.
67. Kowaleski, Local Markets and Regional Trade, 306–307; Hatcher, English
Tin Production, 90–96, 116–117, 126–127.
68. Farmer, “Prices and Wages,” 437; Dyer, Standards of Living, 207, 210–233;
Dyer,AnAge of transition?, 126–172, 173–210; Horrox andOrmrod,ASocialHistory
of England, 216, 238–259, 276–292; Broadberry et al., British Economic Growth,
60, 249, 258–259, 261, 313, 320–322; Humphries and Weisdorf, “Unreal Wages?,”
20, 48; for an increase in farm output and wages in the 1370s, see Clark, “Growth or
Stagnation?,” 70, 73.
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world would actually end seems to have led plague survivors to a
perception of greater disposable income that needed to be spent on
conspicuous consumption and riotous living before the death bell
tolled. Much of the population is thus considered to have enjoyed a
better diet, finer clothes, and better housing; they accumulated more
property through their inheritances; and more goods and services
were available to them. The plague survivors made, bought, and sold
more goods more often, reflecting an increasing per capita commer-
cialization after the first shock of the Black Death.69 Some undoubt-
edly chose leisure over income maximization.70 Indeed, the idleness,
depravity, arrogance, and greed of the workingman, who, after the
Black Death, both turned his nose up at employment while also
demanding “outrageous” wages—taking advantage of an improved
bargaining position within a labor-starved market—was a common
theme of chroniclers and moralists in the years following the first
onslaught of the plague, a topos repeated in the English government’s
largely ineffective attempts to stem the tide of rising wages and prices
at the same time.71 These same writers bemoaned the resultant
enrichment of the poor and servile, who began to dress in “outra-
geous and excessive apparel … contrary to their estate and degree”
and futilely attempted to regulate clothing according to social status
in the Sumptuary Laws.72 This contemporary evidence of rising nom-
inal wages and spending on immoderate and lavish dress might well
be interpreted as a perfectly reasonable reaction to an exogenous
shock. Boccaccio memorably wrote that when the plague arrived in
Florence in 1348, people reacted in two ways: some became sober
and abstemious in order to reduce the risk of infection, but others,
took the opposite view and maintained that an infallible way of
warding of this appalling evil [the plague] was to drink heavily,
enjoy life to the full, go round singing and merrymaking, gratifying
all of one’s cravings whenever the opportunity offered and to shrug
the whole thing off as one enormous joke. … they would visit one
tavern after another, drinking all day and all night to immoderate
excess … for people behaved as though their days were numbered
and they treated their belongings and their own persons with equal
abandon.73
69. Britnell, Commercialisation, 326–30.
70. Hatcher, “Unreal Wages,” 21.
71. See, e.g., the Historia Roffensis, the Chronicon Henrici Knighton, and the
Ordinance and Statute of Labourers, all conveniently translated in Horrox, The
Black Death, 70, 79, 289, 312, 324.
72. See, e.g., the Sumptuary legislation, in Horrox, The Black Death, 340.
73. The Decameron by Giovanni Boccaccio, in Horrox, The Black Death, 29.
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Furthermore, when the plague returned in the early 1360s, authors
writing on the disease advised that not dwelling on death, thinking
happy thoughts, and enjoying life to the fullest might protect them
against the disease. In particular, Florentine professor of medicine,
Tommaso Del Garbo, advised his patients to “surround themselves
with beautiful things—gold, silver, precious gems—and to robe them-
selves in expensive clothing.”74 Thus, following the foremost medical
advice available at the time might actually have increased demand for
goods and clothing. As Figure 1 and Table 1 demonstrate, merchants
attempted to meet that demand. Indeed, it is likely that they saw this as
a commercial opportunity that, as these figures indicate, resulted in
merchants extendingmore credit tomore customers. The importance of
this for this paper is that this additional mercantile buying and selling
was commonly funded by staple credit.
The second case study considers staple lending in 1433. This year, in
contrast, was a low point in staple enrollments, occurring during a
period of credit rationing (see Figure 1 and Table 2).
Only fifteen defaulted staple debts were enrolled 1433. These fifteen
defaulted transactions of 1433 were little different from those negoti-
ated in other years. Merchants continued to sell their merchandise to
othermerchants, andmerchants sold goods on credit tomembers of the
gentry.75 This might be compared to the fifty-seven enrollments,
already part of a declining trend, twenty-five years earlier (1408) and
the forty, part of a temporarily rising phase, twenty-five years later
(1458). This lack of credit availability reflects a more sluggish level of
economic activity, as fewer transactions required less staple credit.
This was a self-reinforcing system, a vicious cycle, whereby, as risk-
averse merchants refused to lend, the supply of credit was itself
reduced, resulting in turn in fewer transactions in the economy.
Table 2 Annual count and value of staple certificates by transaction date, 1428–
1433
Year Number of certificates Annual debt value (£)
1428 32 £1,789 9s. 7d.
1429 48 £4,808 19s. 10d.
1430 29 £4,707 11s. 10d.
1431 19 £1,328 6s. 10d.
1432 34 £4,015 0s. 0d.
1433 15 £2,986 19s. 2d.
Source: C 241 and C 152/65.
74. Cohn, The Black Death Transformed, 241–242.
75. See, e.g., TNA C 241/228/30; C 241/226/12; C 241/228/62; C 241/228/72; C
241/228/87.
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Ultimately these fifteen credit agreements were defaulted upon and the
certificates were sent to Chancery in an attempt to recover the money.
This was a tiny volume of lending when compared to the later four-
teenth century (see earlier discussion of 1375 and Figure 1). While
credit rationing at this level lasted for three decades, it did not represent
the abandonment of the staple system. Merchants returned there in the
later fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries to enroll increasing num-
bers of credit agreements (Figure 1). A reduction in mercantile credit at
this time is observable across the board in lower-value transactions as
well.76 The debt pleas—generally under £2 in value—of the borough
courts of Chester (Cheshire), Colchester (Essex), Exeter (Devon), Not-
tingham (Nottinghamshire), andWinchester (Hampshire), while not as
complete as the staple evidence, similarly indicate significant drops in
the number of debt pleas—suggesting a scaling down in lending for
lower-value commercial transactions as well—in the first quarter of the
fifteenth century, in many cases followed by a fragile recovery in the
1450s.77
In the 1420s the plague struck both locally and nationally every
couple of years.78 In 1426–27 the plague tore through London, causing
the royal court to flee and the law courts at Westminster to be sus-
pended for fear of infection. That episode affected other areas in south-
eastern England, such as Great Yarmouth and Colchester. The plague is
known to have raged through parts of England as distant as Canterbury
andNewcastle-upon-Tyne in 1431–32; and in 1433, our year of interest,
a particularly virulent “grave pestilence” ravaged London—the king-
dom’s commercial center—and its suburbs, killingmany “worthymen”
and others. It continued into the following year and then seems to have
spread throughout the kingdom.79 Another commercial variable exert-
ing an influence upon the economy was the size of the money supply.
Mint output in the late 1420s and early 1430s certainly suggests a
reduced amount of currency in circulation. However, this was not
significantly lower than that estimated for the period around 1375.80
Yet merchants’ business strategies seem to have been entirely different
from those in the later fourteenth century. In the early fifteenth century,
merchants rationed credit rather than lending more, as they had done
sixty years earlier. Merchants must therefore have based their invest-
ment strategies not on unknowable exogenous variables such as the
76. See, e.g., Stevens, “London Creditors,” 1090.
77. Goddard, Credit and Trade, 147–193; Britnell, Growth and Decline in Col-
chester, 281; Kowaleski, Local Markets and Regional Trade, 202–205.
78. Rawcliffe, Urban Bodies, 365–6.
79. Rawcliffe, Urban Bodies, 366.
80. Allen,Mints andMoney, 313, 344, and appendix, table C.3; Palma, “Recon-
struction of the Money Supply,” 8, 15, 19.
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impact of deadly epidemics or the size of the money supply—although
these undoubtedly played a role in remolding the economy in a macro
sense—but rather on local commercial conditions that they experi-
enced every day.
The commercial conditions that merchants experienced in the early
1430s were not propitious. In terms of the English agricultural econ-
omy, crisis periods are identified at the turn of the fifteenth century and
in the 1430s, with particular problems being felt in the arable sector
until the 1470s.81 This is seen, for example, in the agricultural problems
and falling incomes experienced by both Durham Cathedral Priory and
Bishops of Durham, which started to reach crisis levels in the 1430s.82
In terms of estimates of English real GDP (a total of the value-added
outputs of agriculture, industry, and services), the period from 1348 to
1450 is the only one in which real GDP growth was negative, declining
slowly from the 1420s to a low point in 1433.83 Even in terms of real
GDP per head, the early fifteenth century similarly witnessed negative
growth (more commonly known as “decline”) and was reduced from
the early 1420s, continuing at a diminished level into the late fifteenth
century.84 While the measurement of GDP in the medieval period is
fraught with difficulties, it is likely that these estimates do reveal some
of the commercial obstacles that affected merchants’ choices in the
1420s and 1430s. The output from key industrial sectors such as textile
production similarly declined, dramatically in absolute terms (but less
aggressively in per capita terms when the dwindling population is
taken into account), in the early fifteenth century.85 From a regional
perspective, Yorkshire’s economy started to fatally contract in the
1420s and 1430s and reached a low point between 1438 and 1440;
Salisbury’s cloth industry was at its most productive in ca. 1400 but
had started to decline by 1421; Colchester’s textile industry was at its
peak in 1410–1415, after which it also suffered decline, and then,
echoing the credit trends, expanded again (albeit briefly) in the
mid-1440s; and Coventry’s post-plague economic boom started to fail
in the 1390s, with recession taking a firm hold there by the 1420s.86
81. Dodds and Britnell, Agriculture and Rural Society, 32, 34, 119; Broadberry
et al., British Economic Growth, 114–115. Gregory Clark’s evidence disagrees and
suggests a relative buoyancy in per capita agricultural output from the 1420s; see
Clark, “Growth or Stagnation?,” 73, 76–78.
82. Brown, Rural Society and Economic Change, 50.
83. Broadberry et al., British Economic Growth, 197–199, 231.
84. Broadberry et al., British Economic Growth, 204–206, 231–233.
85. Broadberry et al., British Economic Growth, 139, 179.
86. Kermode, “Money and Credit”, 499; Bolton, The Medieval English Econ-
omy, 251; Bridbury, Medieval English Clothmaking, 67, 69; Britnell, Growth and
Decline in Colchester, 181; Goddard, “Commercial Contraction and Urban Decline,”
21; Goddard, “The Built Environment and the Later Medieval Economy,” 42.
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Finally, evidence from textile exports—here again acting as a touch-
stone for domestic production—supports the notion of an early
fifteenth-century recession.87 While cloth exports started to recover
in the mid-1420s from a significant decline dating from the end of the
fourteenth century, English wool exports began their rapid decline,
from 17,124 sacks in 1422–23 to just 1,706 sacks in 1433–34, a low
point not seen again until the early sixteenth century.88 This nadir has
often been blamed on the strictly enforced Calais Staple Bullion and
PartitionOrdinances of 1429,89which requiredCalais staplemerchants
to sell their wool for cash only; theywere no longer permitted to extend
credit to their Flemish customers. This resulted in a rapid decline in
wool sales that forced less well-capitalized English merchants out of
business. This seems to have had the knock-on effect of reducing the
amount of credit extended throughout England (as seen in Table 2) due
to the close interconnectivity between exporters and their domestic
suppliers. Wool prices also dropped precipitously between the 1430s
and the 1450s.90 Falling prices are a precondition of most recessions
that further testifies to an economy that was in decline in the early
fifteenth century.91 Formerchants, fallingmarket prices maywell have
reduced the potential for making profitable deals, which in turn might
have lessened the demand fromdebtors to obtain sales credit in the first
place. Falling prices would have been an easily discernible warning,
one that, in conjunction with all the other recessive market trends
discussed earlier, would act as a clear incentive to ration credit.
Thiswealth of evidence suggests thatmerchants pursued an entirely
reasonable coping strategy of credit rationing during this period of
recession based not on their understanding of sweeping, global eco-
nomic change but rather on the local business conditions with which
they were confronted every day. Table 2 might therefore be interpreted
as a gentle decline in lending as merchants slowly reacted to a worsen-
ing commercial climate by restricting lending and reducing the amount
of sales credit they extended. If merchants were uncertain about the
future, and the brief examination of economic conditions of the 1420s
and 1430s discussed earlier may well have given rise to uncertainty,
and saw their fellowmerchants cutting back on lending, then the expe-
dient business choice would be to do likewise.
87. Britnell, Britain and Ireland, 327, 329, 330, 332.
88. Carus-Wilson and Coleman, England’s Export Trade, 57–60.
89. Munro,Wool, Cloth and Gold, 84–86; Lloyd, English Wool Trade, 261–262,
265–266; Sutton, Mercery of London, 244–245, 258.
90. Farmer. “Prices and Wages,” 437.
91. Mayhew, “Prices in England,” 31. For the association of price falls and
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Conclusions
Business confidence is usually understood as an attempt to estimate the
amount of optimism or pessimism that managers feel about the pros-
pects for their businesses. We will never know what motivated mer-
chants to restrict lending in the fifteenth century. However, their
collective actions reveal much about their confidence in their business
prospects: a combination of a reduction in demand for credit, as poten-
tial borrowers saw fewer and fewer viable business opportunities, and
merchants cutting back on the amount of credit they chose to extend
during commercially demanding periods. In the less hurried, less fren-
zied commercial environment of medieval England, this restriction in
lending might well be a signal of merchants’ prevailing feeling of com-
mercial pessimism over time being reflected in their commercial
actions. This interpretation is supported by the increasing repayment
terms negotiated between creditors and debtors in those decades and in
the lengthening of defaulted debt recovery times at Chancery—perhaps
reflecting an increase in debt restructuring—during the same periods of
tight credit and commercial unease. In the absence of other evidence
concerning medieval merchants’ motivations and investment deci-
sions, it is argued here that patterns of mercantile, high-value lending
in the later Middle Ages might be used as a proxy measure of medieval
business confidence.
Needless to say, while global exogenous variables such as the Black
Death and the size of the money supply may well have played a role in
creating the preconditions that shaped commercial conditions, medie-
val merchants reacted rather to prevailing business circumstances that
were firmly within the human realm. In the later fourteenth century, a
healthy money supply might well have aided or supported increased
commercial interaction, but it was higher wages and increased demand
that generated a confident perception of remunerative opportunities
that thus increased staple lending; in the early fifteenth century, the
money supply remained relatively stable, but the long-term effect of
high mortality no doubt led to declining demand as the population
dwindled, making—and this is what really mattered to merchants—
customers harder and harder to find. This was combined with acute
economic problems that would have been easily observable to those
who regularly bought and sold on credit. This caused uncertainty and,
as a resulting coping strategy, merchants rationed credit. Rather than
seeing the Black Death or the bullion famine as “prime movers” in
mercantile investment, this paper suggests that merchants’ expecta-
tions were affected instead by local commercial factors and that it
was expectations concerning these that played the key role in their
mercantile investment decisions. Based upon their more restricted
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and local viewpoint of transactions going wrong, debtors increasingly
unable to pay back what they owed, declining demand, and a host of
other inimical commercial factors, merchants, like banks in the 2008
credit crunch, cut back the amount of credit they extended to their
customers. Medieval merchants’ attempts to manage uncertainty and
risk can be most clearly discerned in their lending behavior. This may
be an alternative and rewardingway to use premodern debt evidence to
gain access to the motives and methods of businesspeople of the past.
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